FAVORITE BAR AREAS IN THE LAST TWO DIGITALIZED BAR EXAMINATIONS; Real Party-in-Interest (Part II).
Remedial Law Bar Examinations; Real Party in Interest
The topic of real party-in-interest has been the subject of bar questions in previous bar examinations, most recently in the last two digitalized bar examinations.
Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court lays down the definition of a real party in interest as follows:
SEC. 2. Parties in interest. - A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise provided by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.
The rule on real parties in interest has two (2) requirements, namely:
(a) to institute an action, the plaintiff must be the real party in interest; and
(b) the action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. Interest within the meaning of the Rules of Court means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved. One having no material interest cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as the plaintiff in an action.
When the plaintiff is not the real party in interest, the case is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action. In Spouses Oco v. Limbaring, the Court expounded on the purpose of this rule, to wit: Necessarily, the purposes of this provision are:
1) to prevent the prosecution of actions by persons without any right, title or interest in the case;
2) to require that the actual party entitled to legal relief be the one to prosecute the action;
3) to avoid multiplicity of suits; and
4) discourage litigation and keep it within certain bounds, pursuant to public policy.
G.R. No. 208928 July 8, 2015
ANDY ANG, Petitioner,
vs.
SEVERINO PACUNIO, TERESITA P. TORRALBA, SUSANA LOBERANES, CHRISTOPHER N. PACUNIO, and PEDRITO P. AZARCON, represented by their attorney-in-fact, GALILEO P. TORRALBA, Respondents.
✍️🧑⚖️ PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Rule 3, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, in part, provides:
SECTION 1. Who may be parties; plaintiff and defendant. - Only natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action.
The Rules provide that parties may only be natural or juridical persons or entities that may be authorized by statute to be parties in a civil action. Basic is the concept of natural and juridical persons in our Civil Code.
The Resident Marine Mammals are comprised of "toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean species inhabiting Tañon Strait." While relatively new in Philippine jurisdiction, the issue of whether animals have legal standing before courts has been the subject of academic discourse in light of the emergence of animal and environmental rights.
In the United States, animal rights advocates have managed to establish a system which Hogan explains as the "guardianship model for nonhuman animals":
The difficulty of enforcing the statutory rights of nonhuman animals threatens the integrity of the federal statutes designed to protect them, essentially rendering them meaningless. Sensing that laws protecting nonhuman animals would be difficult to enforce, Congress provided for citizen suit provisions: the most well-known example is found in the Endangered Species Act (ESA). Such provisions are evidence of legislative intent to encourage civic participation on behalf of nonhuman animals. Our law of standing should reflect this intent and its implication that humans are suitable representatives of the natural environment, which includes nonhuman animals. (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
When a court allows guardianship as a basis of representation, animals are considered as similarly situated as individuals who have enforceable rights but, for a legitimate reason (e.g., cognitive disability), are unable to bring suit for themselves. They are also similar to entities that by their very nature are incapable of speaking for themselves (e.g., corporations, states, and others).
[Marguerite Hogan, Standing for Nonhuman Animals: Developing a Guardianship Model from the Dissents in Sierra Club v. Morton, 95 CAL. L. REV. 513 (2007)]
In our jurisdiction, persons and entities are recognized both in law and the Rules of Court as having standing to sue and, therefore, may be properly represented as real parties in interest. The same cannot be said about animals.
Animals play an important role in households, communities, and the environment. While we, as humans, may feel the need to nurture and protect them, we cannot go as far as saying we represent their best interests and can, therefore, speak for them before the courts. As humans, we cannot be so arrogant as to argue that we know the suffering of animals and that we know what remedy they need in the face of an injury.
Even in Hogan's discussion, she points out that in a case before the United States District Court for the Central District of California, Animal Lovers Volunteer Ass'n v. Weinberger, the court held that an emotional response to what humans perceive to be an injury inflicted on an animal is not within the "zone-of-interest" protected by law. Such sympathy cannot stand independent of or as a substitute for an actual injury suffered by the claimant.
The ability to represent animals was further limited in that case by the need to prove "genuine dedication" to asserting and protecting animal rights:
What ultimately proved fatal to ALVA 's claim, however, was the court's assertion that standing doctrine further required ALVA to differentiate its genuine dedication to the humane treatment of animals from the general disdain for animal cruelty shared by the public at large. In doing so, the court found ALVA 's asserted organizational injury to be abstract and thus relegated ALVA to the ranks of the "concerned bystander. "
It is my opinion that, at best, the use of the Oposa doctrine in environmental cases should be allowed only when:
a) there is a clear legal basis for the representative suit;
b) there are actual concerns based squarely upon an existing legal right;
c) there is no possibility of any countervailing interests existing within the population represented or those that are yet to be born; and
d) there is an absolute necessity for such standing because there is a threat of catastrophe so imminent that an immediate protective measure is necessary. Better still, in the light of its costs and risks, we abandon the precedent all together. [J. Leanen, Concurring Opinion in Arigo v. Swift, G.R No. 206510, September 14, 2014, 13 <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2014/september:iO 14/206510 _leonen.pdf> [Per J. Villarama, Jr., En Banc].
The expansion of what constitutes "real party in interest" to include minors and generations yet unborn is a recognition of this court's ruling in Oposa v. Factoran. This court recognized the capacity of minors (represented by their parents) to file a class suit on behalf of succeeding generations based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility to ensure the future generation's access to and enjoyment of [the] country's natural resources.
In citizen's suits, persons who may have no interest in the case may file suits for others. Uninterested persons will argue for the persons they represent, and the court will decide based on their evidence and arguments. Any decision by the court will be binding upon the beneficiaries, which in this case are the minors and the future generations. The court's decision will be res judicata upon them and conclusive upon the issues presented.
The danger in invoking Oposa v. Factoran to justify all kinds of environmental claims lies in its potential to diminish the value of legitimate environmental rights. Extending the application of "real party in interest" to the Resident Marine Mammals, or animals in general, through a judicial pronouncement will potentially result in allowing petitions based on mere concern rather than an actual enforcement of a right. It is impossible for animals to tell humans what their concerns are. At best, humans can only surmise the extent of injury inflicted, if there be any. Petitions invoking a right and seeking legal redress before this court cannot be a product of guesswork, and representatives have the responsibility to ensure that they bring "reasonably cogent, rational, scientific, well-founded arguments" on behalf of those they represent.
Creative approaches to fundamental problems should be welcome. However, they should be considered carefully so that no unintended or unwarranted consequences should follow. I concur with the approach of Madame Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro in her brilliant ponencia as it carefully narrows down the doctrine in terms of standing. Resident Marine Mammals and the human petitioners have no legal standing to file any kind of petition.
In the case of G.R. No. L-57469 April 15, 1988
GUEVARA REALTY, INC. vs. Court off Appeals, this Court has resolved the main issue that whether or not the sub-lessees of Ma Kong are bound by the judgment rendered against Ma Kong, in the ejectment case although they were not made parties in the ejectment case.
We rule in the affirmative. This Court state:
"A judgment of eviction against a lessee affects his sub-lessee, even if the latter are not sued in the ejectment case. This is so, because a sublessee can invoke no right superior to that of his sublessor, and the moment the latter is duly ousted from the premises, the former has no leg to stand on. The sublessees' right, if any, is to demand reparation for damages from his sublessor, should the latter be at fault. The sublessees can only assert such right of possession as could have been granted them by their sublessor, their right of possession depending entirely upon that of the latter" (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. 5, pp. 194-195, citing the cases of Ng Sui Tan v. Amparo, 80 Phil. 921; Go King v. Geronimo, 81 Phil. 445; Sipin v. Court of First Instance of Manila, 74 Phil. 650; Madrigal v. Ang Sam To, et al., 46 Off. Gas 2173). (Rollo, pp. 40-44).
To hold otherwise is to permit a situation where Ma Kong or his privies can defeat the judgment, by the mere device of constituting petitioners as alleged tenants and/or lessees over the premises from which he has been ejected by final and executory judgment.
More so in the instant case, where Ma Kong has already relinquished all his rights to the leased premises, considering that he has lost the case filed against him by the owner, and, thus, the only removing link of petitioners to their alleged right to continue in the occupancy of the premises was thereby severed and totally cut off. Petitioners must perforce be likewise ousted from the premises —"for the river cannot rise higher that its source. "
G.R. No. L-57469 April 15, 1988
GUEVARA REALTY, INC.,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Represented by HON. JUSTICES EDGARDO L. PARAS, et al.
✍️👨⚖️GUTIERREZ, JR., J.
---
If you believe this Page has helped you with your legal studies and keeping up with current events, please consider supporting us by clicking Advertisements (ads) once a day.
This is how our Pages work and how we will continue to provide valuable content related to laws and jurisprudence.
Comments
Post a Comment