(Part 19) EN BANC | Hernando, J. | Re Alleged Extortion Activities of Judge Abul
(Part 19) EN BANC | Hernando, J. | Re Alleged Extortion Activities of Judge Abul [A.M. No. RTJ-17-2486 [Formerly A.M. No. 17-02-45-RTC], September 08, 2020]
The antecedents
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RULING:
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In criminal cases, the rule is that the death of an accused after conviction but during the pendency of his/her appeal shall result in the dismissal of the criminal case. This dismissal is triggered by the presumption of innocence accorded to every accused as well as by his/her right to due process under the Constitution.
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As the said principles are instrumental to criminal as well as to civil cases, these should likewise be applied to administrative proceedings such as the one at bench. "[Since the death of an accused extinguishes personal criminal liability as well as pecuniary penalties arising from the felony when the death occurs before final judgment in criminal cases, the standard for an administrative case should be similar 01 less punitive.]" "If this is the standard for criminal cases wherein the quantum [of proof] is beyond a reasonable doubt, then a lower standard for administrative proceedings such as the case at bar should be followed, even if the quantum of proof therein is substantial evidence."
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Thus, the Court so now holds that the death of a respondent in an administrative case before its final resolution is a cause for its dismissal. Otherwise stated, the non-dismissal of a pending administrative case in view of the death of the respondent public servant is a transgression of his or her Constitutional rights to due process and presumption of innocence. Simply put, upon the death of the respondent public servant awaiting final judgment, the dismissal of the administrative case against him/her should necessarily follow.
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Criminal liability is immediately extinguished if the accused dies before final judgment is rendered. The reason is simple: due process requires that the accused be informed of the evidence and findings against them, and be given the opportunity to appeal the conviction. As the ponencia correctly points out, there is no reason why the same principle should not apply in administrative cases where a lower quantum of proof is required.
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It is settled that this Court's jurisdiction over a disciplinary case of a court official or employee, once acquired, is not lost simply because the respondent has ceased to hold office during the pendency of the case. Thus, respondents cannot escape liability if they retire or resign from public office. Death, however, cannot be likened to these types of cessation from public office.
I explained in my previous Dissenting Opinion that the rationale for the rule on the continuation of proceedings, despite cessation from public office, must first take into account the nature of the cessation:
Cessation from public office during the pendency of the case may occur in three (3) different ways: (1) resignation; (2) retirement; or (3) death.
Resignation requires intent. It is a voluntary cessation from public office. Sometimes, however, respondents in disciplinary proceedings opt to resign to avoid being forcibly dismissed from service. Thus, this Court has stated that resignation "should be used neither as an escape nor as an easy way out to evade administrative liability by a court personnel facing administrative sanction."
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Therefore, once this Court assumes jurisdiction—that is, after an administrative case has been filed—resignation from public office will not render the case moot. In Pagano v. Nazarro, Jr.:
A case becomes moot and academic only when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits of the case. The instant case is not moot and academic, despite the petitioner's separation from government service. Even if the most severe of administrative sanctions - that of separation from service - may no longer be imposed on the petitioner, there are other penalties which may be imposed on her if she is later found guilty of administrative offenses charged against her, namely, the disqualification to hold any government office and the forfeiture of benefits.
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Moreover, this Court views with suspicion the precipitate act of a government employee in effecting his or her separation from service, soon after an administrative case has been initiated against him or her. An employee's act of tendering his or her resignation immediately after the discovery of the anomalous transaction is indicative of his or her guilt as flight in criminal cases.
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Retirement, meanwhile, may be optional or compulsory. Optional retirement for government employees may be availed after 20 to 30 years of service, regardless of age. Judges and justices may also opt to retire upon reaching 60 years old as long as they have rendered 15 years of service in the judiciary. Optional retirement, like resignation, is a voluntary cessation from public office. Thus, the same rationale is applied to those who avail of optional retirement during the pendency of an administrative case. In Aquino, Jr. v. Miranda:
A public servant whose career is on the line would normally want the investigating body to know his or her whereabouts for purposes of notice. The timing of respondent's application for leave, for optional retirement, and her sudden unexplained disappearance, taken together, leads us to conclude that hers is not a mere case of negligence. Respondent's acts reveal a calculated design to evade or derail the investigation against her. Her silence at the least serves as a tacit waiver of her opportunity to refute the charges made against her.
. . . .
Neither respondent's disappearance nor her retirement precludes the Court from holding her liable. Her disappearance constitutes a waiver of her right to present evidence in her behalf. The Court is not ousted of its jurisdiction over an administrative case by the mere fact that the respondent public official ceases to hold office during the pendency of respondent's case.
Respondents in an administrative case could apply for optional retirement to evade liability. Thus, optional retirement during the pendency of an administrative case, like resignation, will not render the case moot.
Unlike resignation, however, retirement may also be involuntary. Retirement from public service is compulsory for government employees who have reached 65 years old or for judges and justices who have reached 70 years old.
In the leading case of Perez v. Abiera, this Court was confronted with the issue of whether an administrative complaint against a judge, was rendered moot when he compulsorily retired while the case was pending. Citing Diamalon v. Quintillan respondent Judge Carlos Abiera argued y that he could not be meted the penalty of dismissal since he was no longer in service.
In Quintillan, this Court dismissed the complaint against Judge Jesus Quintillan since he had already resigned from service before a judgment could be rendered:
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary[T]he petition for dismissal must be granted. There is no need to inquire further into the charge imputed to respondent Judge that his actuation in this particular case failed to satisfy the due process requirement. As an administrative proceeding is predicated on the holding of an office or position in the Government and there being no doubt as to the resignation of respondent Judge having been accepted as of August 31, 1967, there is nothing to stand in the way of the dismissal prayed for.
In Abiera, however, this Court clarified that Quintillan was not meant to be a precedent to immediately dismiss complaints against judges who resigned or retired while the administrative cases were pending: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibraryIt was not the intent of the Court in the case of Quintillan to set down a hard and fast rule that the resignation or retirement of a respondent judge as the case may be renders [sic] moot and academic the administrative case pending against him; nor did the Court mean to divest itself of jurisdiction to impose certain penalties short of dismissal from the government service should there be a finding of guilt on the basis of the evidence. In other words, the jurisdiction that was Ours at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the respondent public official had ceased to be in office during the pendency of his case. The Court retains its jurisdiction either to pronounce the respondent official innocent of the charges or declare him guilty thereof. A contrary rule would be fraught with injustices and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous implications. For what remedy would the people have against a judge or any other public official who resorts to wrongful and illegal conduct during his last days in office? What would prevent some corrupt and unscrupulous magistrate from committing abuses and other condemnable acts knowing fully well that he would soon be beyond the pale of the law and immune to all administrative penalties? If only for reasons of public policy, this Court must assert and maintain its jurisdiction over members of the judiciary and other officials under its supervision and control for acts performed in office which are inimical to the service and prejudicial to the interests of litigants and the general public. If innocent, respondent official merits vindication of his name and integrity as he leaves the government which he served well and faithfully, if guilty, he deserves to receive the corresponding censure and a penalty proper and imposable under the situation.
This Court, thus, established that: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibraryIn short, the cessation from office of a respondent Judge either because of resignation, retirement or some other similar cause does not per se warrant the dismissal of an administrative complaint which was filed against him while still in the service. Each case is to be resolved in the context of the circumstances present thereat.As this doctrine developed, this Court has interpreted "some other similar cause" to include death. Death, however, cannot be placed on the same footing as resignation or retirement. Resignation and optional retirement are voluntary modes of cessation. The respondent may avail of them as a way to escape or evade liability. This Court, therefore, should not be ousted of its jurisdiction to continue with the administrative complaint even if the resignation is accepted or the application for retirement is approved.
Death, unless self-inflicted, is involuntary. Respondents who die during the pendency of the administrative case against them do not do so with the intent to escape or evade liability. The rationale for proceeding with administrative cases despite resignation or optional retirement, therefore, cannot apply.
It is conceded that compulsory retirement is also involuntary. Respondents or this Court cannot fight against the passage of time.
Abiera, however, had a different rationale for respondents who have reached the compulsory age of retirement: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibraryA contrary rule would be fraught with injustices and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous implications. For what remedy would the people have against a judge or any other public official who resorts to wrongful and illegal conduct during his last days in office? What would prevent some corrupt and unscrupulous magistrate from committing abuses and other condemnable acts knowing fully well that he would soon be beyond the pale of the law and immune to all administrative penalties? If only for reasons of public policy, this Court must assert and maintain its jurisdiction over members of the judiciary and other officials under its supervision and control for acts performed in office which are inimical to the service and prejudicial to the interests of litigants and the general public.
In formulating the doctrine, this Court was trying to guard against corrupt and unscrupulous magistrates who would commit abuses knowing fully well that after retirement, they could no longer be punished.
It is this certainty of cessation that differentiates compulsory retirement from death as a mode of cessation from public service. A respondent judge knows when he or she will compulsorily retire. In contrast, nobody knows when one will die, unless the cause of death is self-inflicted. Even those with terminal illnesses cannot pinpoint the exact day when they will die.
The essence of due process in administrative cases is simply the opportunity to be heard. Respondents must be given the opportunity to be informed of and refute the charges against them in all stages of the proceedings.
Only in resignation and retirement can there be a guarantee that respondents will be given the opportunity to be heard. Even if they resign or retire during the pendency of the administrative case, they can still be aware of the proceedings and actively submit pleadings. Thus, they should not be allowed to evade liability by the simple expediency of separation from public service.
It would be illogical and impractical to treat dead respondents as equal to resigned or retired respondents. Dead respondents are neither aware of the continuation of the proceedings against them, nor are in any position to submit pleadings. Death forecloses any opportunity to be heard. Continuing with the administrative proceedings even after the respondent's death, therefore, is a violation of the right to due process. (Citations omitted)
Here, respondent only knew of the conclusions of the judicial audit team before his death. He had no knowledge that the Office of the Con' Administrator would adopt the findings of the judicial audit team, he certainly would not have known that this Court would adopt the findings of the Office of the Court Administrator. As was demonstrated by the subsequent events of this case, his widow was the one who filed a Motion for Reconsideration—not to ask for clemency, but rather, to have the case dismissed, because her husband did not know he would be found guilty of the charges against him.
At the risk of being repetitive, I must reiterate: death forecloses any opportunity to be heard. Resigned or retired respondents should not be treated in the same manner as dead respondents. The reason should be easy enough to comprehend: only respondents who are still alive can speak, and, ultimately, be heard.
We explain the reasons for reversing Our previous ruling.
The bundle of precedents relied on public policy, that is, public office is a public trust. Thus, in administrative cases, the death of a respondent public official during its pendency is not a cause for its dismissal except in the following instances: a) the respondent was denied due process; b) there are attendant exceptional circumstances that would merit equitable and humanitarian consideration; and c) depending on the kind of penalty imposed.
However, if viewed from the Constitutional lens, particularly that the respondent in the administrative case, similar to the accused in criminal cases, likewise enjoys the rights to presumption of innocence and due process, the Court now deems the dismissal of the instant administrative case proper based on the following grounds: (1) pending final judgment in the administrative case, the respondent enjoys the right to be presumed innocent; (2) the rule in criminal cases that death of an accused extinguishes personal criminal liability as well as pecuniary penalties arising from the felony when the death occurs before final judgment should likewise be applied in administrative cases; (3) the essence of the due process necessitates the dismissal of the administrative case; and (4) humanitarian reasons also call for the grant of death and survivorship benefits in favor of the heirs.
The First Ground: Presumption of Innocence
Article 3, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution provides that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved x x x" Certainly until an accused is finally adjudged guilty by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, there is a presumption of his/her innocence. Thus, considering that only substantial evidence is required in administrative cases, a respondent therein should likewise be presumed innocent if his/her death preceded the finality of a judgment, as in the case of Judge Abul who can no longer submit additional evidence to support his position due to his passing. The presumption of innocence in his favor should stand precisely because his death preceded the promulgation of final judgment.
The Second Ground: Extinguishment of Liability Upon Death
With regard to the extinguishment of criminal liability, Article 89 (1) of the Revised Penal Code states: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Article 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment; xxx
Based on the aforementioned provision, the death of the accused extinguishes his/her personal criminal liability. Additionally, the pecuniary penalties of the accused will only be extinguished if he/she dies before final judgment is rendered. If the standard for criminal cases wherein the quantum of proof is proof beyond a reasonable doubt, then a lower standard for administrative proceedings such as the case at bench should be applied, since the quantum of proof therein is only substantial evidence.
Although the Court previously pronounced in Gonzales v. Escalona that an administrative case, which is not strictly personal in nature, is not automatically dismissible upon the death of the respondent because public office is public trust, this public policy should not override the presumption of innocence of an accused. It is illogical to consider that mere public policy can defeat one's constitutionally enshrined substantive right to be presumed innocent, as mentioned earlier. If death extinguishes the criminal and civil liabilities arising from criminal cases, then why should more rigid measures or penalties be imposed in mere administrative cases?
A revisit of jurisprudence is necessary to demonstrate the Court's rationale in resolving an administrative case despite the death or retirement (another form of cessation from public service) of the respondent before the release of final judgment.
In Kaw v. Judge Osorio, the Court held that as it was not substantially proven, the respondent judge may not be held liable for extortion and graft, and corruption. Regardless, he was found accountable for violating Canons 2 and 5 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The Court ordered that a P40,000.00 fine should be deducted from his retirement benefits instead since he mandatorily retired before the penalty of dismissal or suspension could be imposed upon him.
In Re: Evaluation of Administrative Liability of Judge Lubao, Judge Lubao was only imposed a fine by reason of his retirement despite having committed several serious, less serious, and light offenses while he was still in service which would have merited the penalty of dismissal, and forfeiture of all his benefits.
In Re: Financial Audit on the Accountabilities of Restituto Tabucon, Jr. Tabucon failed to remit some Judiciary Development Fund collections because he used the money to sustain his family's needs. He eventually restituted the said amounts after he obtained a loan from a friend. The Court ruled that his infraction constituted gross dishonesty if not malversation. However, because dismissal from the service is no longer possible due to Tabucon's compulsory retirement, the Court held that forfeiture of all his retirement and other benefits may be too harsh under the circumstances. Since he restituted his shortages, a P10,000.00 fine was imposed upon Tabucon instead.
In Liwanag v. Lustre, the Court found substantial evidence showing that the respondent judge committed gross misconduct when he sexually molested the complainant. While the OCA recommended his dismissal from the service and forfeiture of all his retirement benefits, the Court modified the penalty by imposing instead a fine because he had already retired. It further stated that the OCA's recommendation to forfeit all of the judge's retirement benefits, "while directed at respondent, might adversely affect innocent members of his family, who are dependent on him and his retirement gratuity." Hence, the Court deemed it best to impose a fine in the amount of P40,000.00
In Geocadin v. Pena Judge Pefia was adjudged guilty of grave misconduct. Since he was afflicted with serious illnesses, he failed to present his evidence during the investigation. The Court noted that there is a presumption of innocence in his favor and that due to his condition, he deserved compassion and humanitarian consideration. Withal, the Court imposed a penalty of reprimand and forfeiture of three months' worth of salary to be deducted from his retirement benefits.
In Re: Judicial Audit Conducted in Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Bangued, Abra although Judge Villarta failed to properly perform his duties as revealed during the judicial audit which the OCA confirmed, he was not able to explain his inaction in the cases assigned to him due to his death. Thus, the Court directed the release of his previously withheld retirement benefits to his heirs.
In Agarao v. Parentela, Jr., Judge Parentela was found guilty of immorality, a serious offense penalized with dismissal from the service and forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine. Since the respondent judge passed away before a decision on his case could be rendered, the Court ordered the forfeiture of one half of all of his retirement benefits excluding his accrued leave credits.
In Loyao, Jr. v. Caube and Quisadio the Court pronounced that notwithstanding its jurisdiction over respondent Caube and the finding that he committed malfeasance, his death precluded the imposition of dismissal from the service upon him. Given that he can no longer serve the said penalty, the Court declared the case as closed and terminated.
In Limliman v. Judge Ulat-Marrero, the respondent judge was charged with grave misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a judge. Pending a formal investigation, the magistrate passed away. The Court dismissed the administrative case as the judge's death barred the continuance of the investigation, wherein factual issues needed to be resolved which necessitated a formal inquiry and reception of evidence.
In Sexton v. Casida "the respondent, who in the meantime died, was found guilty of act unbecoming a public official and acts prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and fined [the amount of] P5,000.00, deductible from his terminal leave pay."
In Re: Judicial Audit Conducted in the Municipal Trial Court of Tambulig and the 11th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Mahayag-Dumingag-Josefina, both in Zambaonga del Sur, the Court found respondent Judge Salvanera guilty of gross inefficiency, gross ignorance of the law, and violations of pertinent administrative circulars of the Court. However, the Court dismissed the case in view of his death and even released his full retirement benefits to his heirs.
In San Buenaventura v. Migriño the respondent was found guilty of simple neglect of duty. The Executive Judge who investigated the case recommended the imposition of a fine equivalent to two months' worth of salary. The OCA modified the penalty to a fine equivalent to a one-month salary for humanitarian consideration and by reason of the death of the respondent. Upon final determination, the Court adopted the recommendation of the OCA to just impose a fine.
Finally, in Bayaca v. Ramos the Court, although it could have imposed a fine upon Judge Ramos for being negligent in his duties, nonetheless dismissed the administrative case in view of his death before the promulgation of the decision. Furthermore, the Court noted the pronouncements in the following cases:
In Baikong Akang Camsa vs. Judge Aurelio Rendon, this Court, citing previous cases, discussed the different implications and effects of the death of a respondent while an administrative complaint is still pending with the Court, viz.:
In Hermosa vs. Paraiso, the respondent, a branch clerk of court of the then Court of First Instance of Masbate, was charged with irregularities while in office. The matter was referred to an Investigating Judge considering that there were persons mentioned in the complaint who had been questioned. The Investigating Judge, in his report of 18 August 1973, recommended that the respondent be exonerated of the charges for lack of sufficient evidence. On 01 August 1974, while the case was pending before the Court, the respondent died. The Court, nevertheless, resolved the case so that the respondent's heirs might not be deprived of any retirement benefits due to them and ordered the dismissal of the case for lack of substantial evidence.
In Mahozca vs. Judge Domagas, the respondent judge, who was charged with gross ignorance of the law for having erroneously granted a demurrer to evidence, died while the case was being evaluated by the OCA for appropriate action. The Court, on the basis of what appeared on record, no factual matter being in serious dispute that would require a formal investigation, resolved to impose a fine of P5,000.00 on the respondent judge, stressing that he had been previously sanctioned by the Court for gross ignorance of the law.
In Apiag vs. Judge Cantero, the respondent judge was charged with gross misconduct for allegedly having committed bigamy and falsification of public documents. The case was referred to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City for investigation, report, and recommendation. An investigation was imperative considering that factual issues, including the circumstances of the respondent's first marriage to the complainant, were inextricably involved. Upon receipt of the report of the Investigating Judge, who recommended that the respondent judge be suspended for one (1) year without pay, the Court referred the matter to OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation. The OCA, in its memorandum, recommended that the respondent judge be dismissed from the service. The respondent judge died while the case was still being deliberated upon by the Court. The Court there held -
However, we also cannot just gloss over the fact that he was remiss in attending to the needs of his children of his first marriage - children whose filiation he did not deny. He neglected them and refused to support them until they came up with this administrative charge. For such conduct, this Court would have imposed a penalty. But in view of his death prior to the promulgation of this Decision, dismissal of the case is now in order.
Considering these cases, it is undeniable that in spite of the death or retirement of the respondents while their administrative cases were pending, only the penalty of fine or deduction from their benefits was eventually imposed upon them. More importantly, some complaints were actually dismissed in view of the respondents' deaths. Furthermore, the respondents' retirement or death/survivorship benefits were not at all automatically forfeited. Evidently, the Court exercised its sound discretion in the imposition of penalties based on the prevailing circumstantial landscape.
The Third Ground: Due Process
The instant administrative complaint against the late Judge Abul should be dismissed in view of the Constitutional principle of due process, which is one of the recognized exceptions to the general rule that the death of the respondent does not preclude a finding of administrative liability. To reiterate, Gonzales v. Escalona states that the exceptions are: "first, the observance of respondent's right to due process; second, the presence of exceptional circumstances in the case on the grounds of equitable and humanitarian reasons; and third, it may also depend on the kind of penalty imposed."
If We were to sustain Our earlier ruling to forfeit all of his retirement benefits, Judge Abul can no longer file any motion or pleading to question the ruling because of his death. Likewise, he can no longer exercise his right to due process, nor can he exhaust other possible remedies available to him. Similarly, he cannot ask for clemency in the future, an option which other respondents who did not meet the same fate can take advantage of if the circumstances permit. In other words, had death not supervened, Judge Abul could have exerted efforts to protect his rights in keeping with the principle of due process. Thus, it is only right to dismiss the administrative case against him, particularly since the spirit of due process encompasses all stages of the case, that is, from the investigation phase until the finality of the decision. In other words, a respondent public officer should be given the opportunity to be heard throughout the whole proceedings.
Indeed, "[t]he essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of."
Besides, the Constitution did not limit or qualify as to what kind of case, whether criminal, civil or administrative, should the principle of due process be applied to. To further assume an already deceased respondent to "participate" in the administrative proceedings would be absurd, precisely because he/she already lost the opportunity to be heard. Hence, to continue adjudicating his/her case amidst his/her death would be a denial of due process.
The Fourth Ground: Humanitarian Reasons
The other exception is the presence of exceptional circumstances on the ground of equitable and humanitarian reasons. Based on this ground, the instant administrative case should be dismissed and death and survivorship benefits should be released to Judge Abul's heirs, as his passing preceded the rendition of a judgment on his administrative case.
Relevantly, Judge Abul's wife, Bernadita, wrote the Court a letter dated September 13, 2017. She asserted that she is a housemaker with no other source of income and that ever since Judge Abul's preventive suspension from office, their family suffered financial difficulties. She then requested the release of the amount pertaining to Judge Abul's accrued leave benefits and other assistance which could be extended to them in order to help their family meet their daily needs and to fund her son's education in medical school.
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It should also be noted that Bernadita's letter dated September 13, 2017 informing the Court of Judge Abul's death preceded the submission of the OCA's Report and Recommendation on February 20, 2018 and the promulgation of the Per Curiam Decision on September 3, 2019. Apart from this, it is an undeniable fact that Judge Abul was murdered mere days after he turned 68 years old. He would have already reached the compulsory age of retirement for judges, specifically seventy (70) years old, prior to the release of the September 3, 2019 Per Curiam Decision, if not for his untimely demise.
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To emphasize, Judge Abul's mistakes should not unduly punish his heirs, especially if they had no part in or knowledge about the alleged extortions. Judge Abul's liability should be considered personal and extinguished upon his death. Similarly, it should not extend beyond his death, and its effects should not be suffered by his heirs, for to do so would indirectly impose a harsh penalty upon innocent individuals.
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These same individuals already have to accept the sudden death of a loved one, the breadwinner at that. Such is already more than enough for any family to bear. The non-dismissal of Judge Abul's administrative case and forfeiture of all of his death and survivorship benefits would just unnecessarily add to the grief of his bereaved family. Thus, the Court, faced with this opportunity to reconsider its prior ruling, should finally dismiss the instant complaint considering the aforementioned grounds.
In connection with this, pertinent to the death of a member of the Judiciary while still in actual service, Sections 2 to 3-A of Republic Act (RA) No. 9946 state that:
'SEC. 2. In case a Justice of the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan or of the Court of Tax Appeals, or a Judge of the regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court in cities, municipal trial court, municipal circuit trial court, shari'a district court, shari'a circuit court, or any other court hereafter established, dies while in actual service, regardless of his/her age and length of service as required under Section 1 hereof, his/her heirs shall receive a lump sum of five (5) years' gratuity computed on the basis of the highest monthly salary plus the highest monthly aggregate of transportation, representation and other allowances such as personal economic relief allowance (PERA) and additional compensation allowance received by him/her as such Justice or Judge: Provided, however, That where the deceased Justice or Judge has rendered at least fifteen (15) years either in the Judiciary or in any other branch of Government, or both, his/her heirs shall instead be entitled to a lump sum often (10) years gratuity computed on the same basis as indicated in this provision: Provided, further, That the lump sum often (10) years gratuity shall be received by the heirs of the Justice or the Judge who was killed because of his/her work as such: Provided, That the Justice or Judge has served in Government for at least five (5) years regardless of age at the time of death. When a Justice or Judge is killed intentionally while in service, the presumption is that the death is work-related.
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Based on the foregoing, Judge Abul's heirs should be given death benefits granted under Section 2 of RA No. 9946. If Judge Abul served for at least 15 years, his heirs should receive a lump sum equivalent to ten (10) years. Alternatively, if he served for less than 15 years, the lump sum should be equivalent to five (5) years. Subsequently, after the gratuity period of ten (10) years has passed, his heirs are entitled to survivorship benefits, specifically, full monthly pension (if Judge Abul rendered at least 15 years of service) or pro-rated monthly pension (if he served for less than 15 years).
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To recapitulate, these are the salient points for the dismissal of the case at bench:
1) because of Judge Abul's death, the administrative complaint against him should be dismissed in accordance with the Constitutional principles of due process and presumption of innocence; and
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2) taking into account the instant Motion for Reconsideration, Judge Abul's heirs should be granted the death benefits and survivorship pension benefits due to his death while in actual service. This is considering that prior to his demise, no definite ruling was rendered and no corresponding penalty was imposed upon him. Equally important is the Court's belief in equitable and humanitarian considerations, especially when the case involves an inevitable occurrence like death.
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WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. The September 3, 2019 Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The instant administrative complaint against the late Judge Godofredo B. Abul, Jr. is DISMISSED. Accordingly, the corresponding death and survivorship benefits are ordered to be RELEASED to the heirs of the late Judge Godofredo B. Abul, Jr.
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EN BANC
A.M. No. RTJ-17-2486 [Formerly A.M. No. 17-02-45-RTC], September 08, 2020
RE: INVESTIGATION REPORT ON THE ALLEGED EXTORTION ACTIVITIES OF PRESIDING JUDGE GODOFREDO B. ABUL, JR., BRANCH 4, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BUTUAN CITY, AGUSAN DEL NORTE
HERNANDO, J.
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