(Part 6) En Banc cases penned by Justice Hernando; DAYRIT vs. NORQUILLAS et al.
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| (Part 6) En Banc cases penned by Justice Hernando; DAYRIT vs. NORQUILLAS et al. |
Jurisdiction is the power and authority of a court or a tribunal to hear, try, and decide a case before it. A judgment rendered by a body without jurisdiction is void and may be attacked any time. It is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint, including the character of the reliefs prayed for.
In contention here is the conflict of jurisdiction between the MCTC and the DARAB. Angelina maintains that the MCTC has jurisdiction over the instant complaint for forcible entry, while respondents maintain that the DARAB has jurisdiction as the action is considered as an agrarian dispute stemming from the enforcement of the CLOAs issued to them.
The Court takes this opportunity to clarify this seeming overlap.
Clarifying the jurisdiction of
DARAB in relation to
possessory and ejectment
actions involving agricultural lands.
Section 33 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended, provides for the jurisdiction of first-level courts. Paragraph two of the provision specifically states:
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer: Provided, That when, in such cases, the defendant raises the questions of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.
In actions for forcible entry, the party is deprived of physical possession of land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. The inquiry centers on who has the prior possession de facto.
Plaintiff's proof of prior physical possession of the usurped property is essential for the action to prosper. This is determined by examining the allegations in the complaint.
On the other hand, Section 50 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (CARL), as amended, provides for the quasi-judicial powers of the DAR, to wit:
Section 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. — The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
x x x x
DAR exercises this adjudicatory power through the DARAB, which is created by Executive Order No. 129-A (series of 1987).
In 2009, the CARL was amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 9700. Section 50 of the CARL was amended as follows:
Section 19. Section 50 of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended, is hereby further amended by adding Section 50-A to read as follows:
"Sec. 50-A. Exclusive Jurisdiction on Agrarian Dispute. — No court or prosecutor's office shall take cognizance of cases pertaining to the implementation of the CARP except those provided under Section 57 of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended. If there is an allegation from any of the parties that the case is agrarian in nature and one of the parties is a farmer, farmworker, or tenant, the case shall be automatically referred by the judge or the prosecutor to the DAR which shall determine and certify within fifteen (15) days from referral whether an agrarian dispute exists: Provided, That from the determination of the DAR, an aggrieved party shall have judicial recourse. In cases referred by the municipal trial court and the prosecutor's office, the appeal shall be with the proper regional trial court, and in cases referred by the regional trial court, the appeal shall be to the Court of Appeals.
"In cases where regular courts or quasi-judicial bodies have competent jurisdiction, agrarian reform beneficiaries or identified beneficiaries and/or their associations shall have legal standing and interest to intervene concerning their individual or collective rights and/or interests under the CARP."
"The fact of non-registration of such associations with the Securities and Exchange Commission, or Cooperative Development Authority, or any concerned government agency shall not be used against them to deny the existence of their legal standing and interest in a case filed before such courts and quasi-judicial bodies."
As can be gleaned from these laws, the MCTC has exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry, while the DARAB has primary jurisdiction over agrarian disputes. An agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to, as related to the instant case, tenancy over lands devoted to agriculture and transfer of ownership from landowner to farmworkers, tenants, and other agrarian reform beneficiaries. The amended CARL adds that the judge or prosecutor shall automatically refer the case to the DAR if there is an allegation from any of the parties that the case is agrarian in nature, and one of the parties is a farmer, farmworker or tenant.
David v. Cordova
… “the public character of the land does not preclude inferior courts from exercising jurisdiction over forcible entry cases.” (End of emphasis).
Robles v. Zambales Chromite Mining Co., et al.
… “the land spoken of in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court includes all kinds of land, whether agricultural or mineral. It is a well known maxim in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish.” (End of emphasis).
Moreover, ejectment proceedings are summary proceedings only intended to provide an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or right to possession of property. Title is not involved. The sole issue to be resolved is the question as to who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the premises or possession de facto.
Pajuyo v. Court of Appeals illustrates this point, thus:
“The only question that the courts must resolve in ejectment proceedings is — who is entitled to the physical possession of the premises, that is, to the possession de facto and not to the possession de jure. It does not even matter if a party's title to the property is questionable, or when both parties intruded into public land and their applications to own the land have yet to be approved by the proper government agency. Regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be thrown out by a strong hand, violence or terror.”
“Neither is the unlawful withholding of property allowed. Courts will always uphold respect for prior possession.
Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his possession, if he has in his favor prior possession in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until a person with a better right lawfully ejects him. To repeat, the only issue that the court has to settle in an ejectment suit is the right to physical possession.” (End of emphasis).
Pitargue v. Sevilla
… “in this case, the government owned the land in dispute. The government did not authorize either the plaintiff or the defendant in the forcible entry case to occupy the land. Both parties were in effect squatting on government property. Yet we upheld the court's jurisdiction to resolve the issue of possession even if title remained with the government.” (End of emphasis).
Courts must not abdicate their jurisdiction to resolve the issue of physical possession because of the public need to preserve the basic policy behind the summary actions of forcible entry and unlawful detainer. The underlying philosophy behind ejectment suits is to prevent breach of peace and criminal disorder and to compel the party out of possession to respect and resort to the law alone to obtain what he claims is his. The party deprived of possession must not take the law into his own hands. Ejectment proceedings are summary in nature so the authorities can settle speedily actions to recover possession because of the overriding need to quell social disturbances.
Thus, the better rule is that even while the power of administration and disposition of public or private agricultural lands belongs to DAR, courts retain jurisdiction over actions for forcible entry involving such lands. To restate this, courts have jurisdiction over possessory actions involving public or private agricultural lands to determine the issue of physical possession as this issue is independent of the question of disposition and alienation of such lands which should be threshed out in DAR.
TAKE NOTE:
It must be stressed that David did not lay down the rule that all ejectment cases, whether involving an agrarian dispute or not, are cognizable by the first-level courts. As Justice Caguioa has pointed out, the reason why the Court sustained the MCTC's jurisdiction therein is not because the case is summary in nature, but because it does not involve an agrarian dispute. David clearly states that the dispute therein is not an agrarian matter. Also, there is indeed an allegation that the land is public in nature - this was even discussed in the ruling. However, the land being public in character is completely separate from the existence of an agrarian dispute. When a dispute involves a public land, it does not necessarily amount to an agrarian dispute; an agrarian dispute is specifically defined in the law.
David should not be understood that jurisdiction on ejectment cases of whatever nature falls on first-level courts; it should be read and understood to provide that first-level courts have jurisdiction on ejectment cases even if the land is public in character as long as the case is not an agrarian dispute. The public character of the land does not divest the courts of jurisdiction over ejectment cases. However, if the ejectment case is found to be an agrarian dispute, the first-level courts will be divested of jurisdiction in accordance with the CARL, as amended. The controlling aspect, therefore, is the nature of the dispute (i.e., agrarian or not) and not the character of the subject land. [DAYRIT vs. NORQUILLAS et al., citing David v. Cordova].
TAKE NOTE:
Chailese Development Company, Inc. v. Dizon (Chailese), which clarifies the jurisdiction of the DARAB over agrarian disputes.
“RA 9700 reinforced the jurisdiction of DAR as already provided in the original CARL. It made clear the requisites for a case to be considered to be an agrarian dispute. It also mandated the automatic referral upon concurrence of the requisites. In Chailese, the Court retroactively applied RA 9700 to the case and ruled that the RTC has jurisdiction over the possessory action due to absence of evidence on the existence of a tenancy relation, thus failing to satisfy the second requisite.”
“Based on the foregoing, David and Chailese can be viewed as guides for the courts in tackling ejectment and possessory actions allegedly involving agrarian disputes. David instructs that not all ejectment cases are cognizable by the first-level courts - those involving agrarian disputes are not cognizable by the first-level courts. In this relation, Chailese clarifies the requisites for an agrarian dispute, and highlights the mandate of the amendatory law of automatic referral of cases involving agrarian disputes to the DAR.”
Based on the said provision, the judge or prosecutor is obligated to automatically refer the cases pending before it to the DAR when the following requisites are present:
a. There is an allegation from any one or both of the parties that the case is agrarian in nature; and
b. One of the parties is a farmer, farmworker, or tenant.
TAKE NOTE:
Retroactive application
of RA 9700 and Chailese on
cases before first-level
courts
Chailese further provides for the retroactive application of Section 50-A of RA 9700:
In this regard, it must be said that there is no merit in the contention of petitioner that the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 9700 cannot be applied retroactively in the case at bar. Primarily, a cursory reading of the provision readily reveals that Section 19 of R.A. No. 9700 merely highlighted the exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR to rule on agrarian cases by adding a clause which mandates the automatic referral of cases upon the existence of the requisites therein stated. Simply, R.A. No. 9700 does not deviate but merely reinforced the jurisdiction of the DAR set forth under Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657. Moreover, in the absence of any stipulation to the contrary, as the amendment is essentially procedural in nature it is deemed to apply to all actions pending and undetermined at the time of its passage.
Thus, the Court can apply RA 9700 to the instant case.
Application to the instant case.
Guided by David and Chailese, the Court now resolves the instant case.
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