My notes on Estrada vs. Escritor
When government action burdens, even inadvertently, a sincerely held religious belief or practice, the state must justify the [burden] by demonstrating that the law embodies a compelling interest, that no less restrictive alternative exists, and that a religious exemption would impair the state’s ability to effectuate its [compelling interest]. As in other instances of state action affecting fundamental rights, negative impacts on those rights demand the highest level of judicial scrutiny.
The state should not be allowed to interfere with the most deeply held fundamental religious convictions of an individual in order to pursue some trivial state economic or bureaucratic objective. This is especially true when there are alternative approaches for the state to effectively pursue its objective without serious inadvertent impact on religion.
If the plaintiff can show that a law or government practice inhibits the free exercise of his religious beliefs, the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate that the law or practice is necessary to the accomplishment of some important (or ‘compelling’) secular objective and that it is the least restrictive means of achieving that objective. If the plaintiff meets this burden and the government does not, the plaintiff is entitled to exemption from the law or practice at issue. In order to be protected, the claimant’s beliefs must be ‘sincere’, but they need not necessarily be consistent, coherent, clearly articulated, or congruent with those of the claimant’s religious denomination. ‘Only beliefs rooted in religion are protected by the Free Exercise Clause’; secular beliefs, however sincere and conscientious, do not suffice.
The Compelling State Interest Test
As previously stated, the compelling state interest test involves a three-step process. We explained this process in detail, by showing the questions which must be answered in each step, viz:
…First, "[H]as the statute or government action created a burden on the free exercise of religion?" The courts often look into the sincerity of the religious belief, but without inquiring into the truth of the belief because the Free Exercise Clause prohibits inquiring about its truth as held in Ballard and Cantwell. The sincerity of the claimant’s belief is ascertained to avoid the mere claim of religious beliefs to escape a mandatory regulation. xxx
xxx xxx xxx
Second, the court asks: "[I]s there a sufficiently compelling state interest to justify this infringement of religious liberty?" In this step, the government has to establish that its purposes are legitimate for the state and that they are compelling. Government must do more than assert the objectives at risk if exemption is given; it must precisely show how and to what extent those objectives will be undermined if exemptions are granted. xxx
xxx xxx xxx
Third, the court asks: "[H]as the state in achieving its legitimate purposes used the least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state?" The analysis requires the state to show that the means in which it is achieving its legitimate state objective is the least intrusive means, i.e., it has chosen a way to achieve its legitimate state end that imposes as little as possible on religious liberties xxx.138 [citations omitted]
Again, the application of the compelling state interest test could result to three situations of accommodation: First, mandatory accommodation would result if the Court finds that accommodation is required by the Free Exercise Clause. Second, if the Court finds that the State may, but is not required to, accommodate religious interests, permissive accommodation results. Finally, if the Court finds that that establishment concerns prevail over potential accommodation interests, then it must rule that the accommodation is prohibited.
Thus, we find that in this particular case and under these distinct circumstances, respondent Escritor’s conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized as she has made out a case for exemption from the law based on her fundamental right to freedom of religion. The Court recognizes that state interests must be upheld in order that freedoms - including religious freedom - may be enjoyed. In the area of religious exercise as a preferred freedom, however, man stands accountable to an authority higher than the state, and so the state interest sought to be upheld must be so compelling that its violation will erode the very fabric of the state that will also protect the freedom. In the absence of a showing that such state interest exists, man must be allowed to subscribe to the Infinite.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant administrative complaint is dismissed.
Read the full decision at
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/jun2006/am_p-02-1651_2006.html
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