Novation & Compromise Agreement; Rescission Under Article 2041 of the Civil Code |
Novation & Compromise Agreement; Rescission Under Article 2041 of the Civil Code |
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[Here], the Appellant says that the lower court erred in holding the claim set forth in the complaint herein has not been "released by novation", which he maintains, took place, because the deed of assignment by Coronado to Leonor the chattel mortgage executed by Sycip in favor of Coronado stated that the sum of P2,450 then due from Sycip was payable on December 31, 1956, whereas the contract of lease between Leonor and Sycip stipulated that the agree rentals were "payable on or before the 5th of every month'. Said assignment was made, however, on October 6, 1956, and, hence, the period therein given for the payment of the aforementioned sum of P2,450.00, due up to that date, did not novate or otherwise affect the obligation to pay the rentals accruing subsequently thereto, in conformity with the provisions of the aforementioned contract of leas or "on or before the 5th of every month", although payment of these rentals was also guaranteed by the chattel mortgage thus assigned to Leonor.
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Inasmuch as Sycip continued defaulting in the payment of such rentals, and failed to pay the same as well as to vacate the leased premises despite repeated demands, it follows that Leonor was entitled to seek the proper remedy against the resulting unlawful detainer by Sycip.
Obviously, the security given to guarantee the payment of rentals falling due after October 6, 1956, did not extinguish or novate the obligation to satisfy the same, or impair the right of the lessor to the aforementioned remedy (Bank of the P.I. v. Herridge, 47 Phil. 57; Asia Banking Manresa 429). There Corporation v. Lacson, 48 Phil. 482; 8 Manresa 429). There is no incompatibility between, either this remedy or said obligation, on the one hand, and the aforementioned security, on the other. On the contrary, the chattel mortgage bolstered up said remedy and strengthened the effectivity of the obligation, by insuring the collection of the money judgment that may be rendered in the action for unlawful detainer.
It is next urged by the defendant that the plaintiff should have sought a judicial foreclosure of the chattel mortgage or sued the guarantor Napoleon A. Coronado. This contention is premised upon the assumption that by the plaintiff's acceptance of the assignment of a chattel mortgage, there had been a novation of the lease contract between him and Sycip, for the period subsequent to October 6, 1956, which is not a fact. Plaintiff had, of course, the option to seek a judicial foreclosure of said chattel mortgage, but he was not bound to do so, for the assignment in his favor of the chattel mortgage merely gave him additional rights. It did not deprive him of any of his existing rights, either substantive or procedural, except insofar as the sum of P2,450 due as rentals up to October 6, 1956, which was made payable on or before December 31, 1956. With respect to the rentals accruing after October 6, 1956, he retained all such rights, plus the corresponding lien on the personal property subject to the chattel mortgage.
Contrary to the defendant's pretense, the plaintiff could not have sued Coronado for, by virtue of his aforementioned assignment, the latter merely yielded his preferred lien in favor of the plaintiff herein and did not assume any responsibility for the defendant's obligation in favor of plaintiff herein. Besides, having violated the chattel mortgage contract, by refusing to deliver the mortgaged property to the sheriff, for purposes of the extra-judicial foreclosure, to which the defendant had explicitly agreed in the deed of a chattel mortgage, he may not require the plaintiff to adhere thereto (Art. 1191,, Civil Code of the Phil.). Again, owing to the breach of the compromise agreement between the parties, resulting, not only from the defendant's refusal to deliver the mortgaged property to the sheriff but, also, from his failure to pay, on or before December 31, 1956, the sum P2,450, due on October 6, 1956, plaintiff has, under Article 2041 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the right eigth to "enforce the compromise or regard it as rescinded a insist upon his original demand".
[…] It is worthy of notice, in this connection, that, unlike Article 2039 of the same Code, which speaks of "a cause of annulment or rescission of the compromise" and provides that "the compromise may be annulled or rescinded" for the cause therein specified, thus suggesting an action for annulment or rescission, said Article 2041 confers up the party concerned, not a "cause" for rescission, or t right to "demand" the rescission, of a compromise, but the authority, not only to "regard it as rescinded", but, also, to "insist upon his original demand". The language this Article 2041, particularly when contrasted with that of Article 2039, denotes that no action for rescission is required in said Article 2041 and that the party aggrieved by the breach of a compromise agreement may if he choose to bring the suit contemplated or involved in his original demand, as if there had never been any compromise agreement, without bringing an action for rescission thereof. He need not seek a judicial declaration of rescission, he may "regard" the compromise agreement already rescinded".
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