Q. No. 2. Criminal Law | Bar 2023 | Suggested Answer

 Q. No. 2. Criminal Law | Bar 2023 | Suggested Answer

Q. No. 2. Criminal Law | Bar 2023

When Joey came home from work, he saw a man and a woman making love in the main bedroom. Enraged at the thought that his wife, Abby, was unfaithful to him, he shot the man and woman to death. However, the couple turned out to be the driver and kasambahay. The families of the decedents filed a case of double Homicide against Joey. Joey invoked the defense of mistake of fact, arguing that he thought the persons he shot were his wife and her lover. Thus, he is entitled to the privilege or benefit of Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code, which entitles a legally married person, who having surprised his or her spouse in the act of sexual intercourse, kills or seriously injures the same, to the penalty of destierro for being an exceptional circumstance. Is Joey correct in invoking the defense of mistake of fact? Discuss.

Suggested Answer.

NOTE, the suggested answers are in discussion-type format and intended to discuss the topic based on available recent jurisprudence. Here, we cited related cases only in relation to the Criminal Law Bar Question No. 2.

The question then squarely presents itself, whether in this jurisdiction one can be held criminally responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be, but which would constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had known the true state of the facts at the time when he committed the act. 

To this question, we think there can be but one answer and we hold that under such circumstances there is no criminal liability, provided always that the alleged ignorance or mistake or fact was not due to negligence or bad faith.

In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact is sufficient to negative a particular intent which under the law is a necessary ingredient of the offense charged (e.g., in larcerny, animus furendi; in murder, malice; in crimes intent) "cancels the presumption of intent," and works an acquittal; except in those cases where the circumstances demand a conviction under the penal provisions touching criminal negligence; and in cases where, under the provisions of article 1 of the Penal Code one voluntarily committing a crime or misdeamor incurs criminal liability for any wrongful act committed by him, even though it be different from that which he intended to commit. (Wharton's Criminal Law, sec. 87 and cases cited; McClain's Crim. Law, sec. 133 and cases cited; Pettit vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 240; Commonwealth vs. Power, 7 Met., 596; Yates vs. People, 32 N.Y., 509; Isham vs. State, 38 Ala., 213; Commonwealth vs. Rogers, 7 Met., 500.)

There can be no crime, large or small, without an evil mind.

Legal maxims

. — The ancient wisdom of the law, equally with the modern, is distinct on this subject. It consequently has supplied to us such maxims as Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea, "the act itself does not make man guilty unless his intention were so;" Actus me incito factus non est meus actus, "an act done by me against my will is not my act;" and others of the like sort. 

Ignorantia facti excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in point of fact is, in all cases of supposed offense, a sufficient excuse"). (Brown's Leg. Max., 2d ed., 190.).

Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such mistake of fact as shows the act committed to have proceeded from no sort of evil in the mind necessarily relieves the actor from criminal liability provided always there is no fault or negligence on his part; and as laid down by Baron Parke, "The guilt of the accused must depend on the circumstances as they appear to him." 

(Reg. vs. Thurborn, 1 Den. C., 387; P. vs. Anderson, 44 Cal.., 65; P. vs. Lamb, 54 Barb., 342; Yates vs. P., 32 N. Y., 509; Patterson vs. P., 46 Barb., 625; Reg. vs. Cohen, 8 Cox C. C., 41; P. vs. Miles, 55 Cal., 207, 209; Nalley vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 387.) 

That is to say, the question as to whether he honestly, in good faith, and without fault or negligence fell into the mistake is to be determined by the circumstances as they appeared to him at the time when the mistake was made, and the effect which the surrounding circumstances might reasonably be expected to have on his mind, in forming the intent, criminal or otherwise, upon which he acted.

If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one has reasonable cause to believe the existence of facts that will justify a killing — or, in terms more nicely in accord with the principles on which the rule is founded, if without fault or carelessness he does believe them — he is legally guiltless of the homicide; though he mistook the facts, and so the life of an innocent person is unfortunately extinguished. In other words, and with reference to the right of self-defense and the not quite harmonious authorities, it is the doctrine of reason and sufficiently sustained in adjudication, that notwithstanding some decisions apparently adverse, whenever a man undertakes self-defense, he is justified in acting on the facts as they appear to him. If, without fault or carelessness, he is misled concerning them and defends himself correctly according to what he thus supposes the facts to be the law will not punish him though they are in truth otherwise, and he was really no occasion for the extreme measures. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 305, and a large array of cases there cited.)

The common illustration in the American and English textbooks of the application of this rule is the case:

where a man, masked and disguised as a footpad, at night and on a lonely road, "holds up" his friends in a spirit of mischief, and with a leveled pistol demands his money or his life, but is killed by his friend under the mistaken belief that the attack is a real one, that the pistol leveled at his head is loaded, and that his life and property are in imminent danger at the hands of the aggressor. No one will doubt that if the facts were such as the slayer believed them to be he would be innocent of the commission of any crime and wholly exempt from criminal liability, although if he knew the real state of the facts when he took the life of his friend he would undoubtedly be guilty of the crime of homicide or assassination. Under such circumstances, proof of his innocent mistake of the facts overcomes the presumption of malice or criminal intent, and (since malice or criminal intent is a necessary ingredient of the "act punished by law" in cases of homicide or assassination) overcomes at the same time the presumption established in article 1 of the code, that the "act punished by law" was committed "voluntarily."

A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at bar convinces us that the defendant Chinaman struck the fatal blow alleged in the information in the firm belief that the intruder who forced open the door of his sleeping room was a thief, from whose assault he was in imminent peril, both of his life and of his property and of the property committed to his charge; that in view of all the circumstances, as they must have presented themselves to the defendant at the time, he acted in good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing no more than exercising his legitimate right of self-defense; that had the facts been as he believed them to be he would have been wholly exempt from criminal liability on account of his act; and that he can not be said to have been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the facts, or in the means adopted by him to defend himself from the imminent danger which he believe threatened his person and his property and the property under his charge.

The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be reversed, and the defendant acquitted of the crime with which he is charged and his bail bond exonerated, with the costs of both instance de oficio. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-5272  March 19, 1910

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
AH CHONG, defendant-appellant.

Gibb & Gale, for appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.

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